Non-interference (NI) is a property of systems stating that confidential actions should not cause effects observable by unauthorized users. Several variants of NI have been studied for many types of models, but rarely for true concurrency or unbounded models. This work investigates NI for High-level Message Sequence Charts (HMSC), a scenario language for the description of distributed systems, based on composition of partial orders. We first propose a general definition of security properties in terms of equivalence among observations, and show that these properties, and in particular NI are undecidable for HMSCs. We hence consider weaker local properties, describing situations where a system is attacked by a single agent, and show that local NI is decidable. We then refine local NI to a finer notion of causal NI that emphasizes causal dependencies between confidential actions and observations, and extend it to causal NI with (selective) declassification of confidential events. Checking whether a system satisfies local and causal NI and their declassified variants are PSPACE-complete problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. Non-interference (NI) has been introduced to characterize the absence of harmful information flow in a system. It ensures that confidential actions of a system can not produce any effect visible by a public observer. The original notion of non-interference in [1] was expressed in terms of language equivalence for deterministic Mealy machines with confidential input and public output. Since then, several variants of information flow properties (IFP) have extended NI to non-deterministic models (transition systems, process algebra, Petri nets,...) and finer notions of observation (simple trace observation, deadlock or branching detection,....) to describe the various observational powers of an attacker. For a given system S, NI is usually defined as:
where ≡ is language equivalence, S denotes the semantics of S, π V is the projection on a subset V of visible actions of the system, and S \ C denotes the model S from which all confidential actions from C are pruned. Intransitive noninterference (INI) relaxes NI to handle possible declassification of confidential actions. It ensures that confidential actions of a system cannot produce any effect visible by a public observer unless they are declassified, causing so a harmless information flow. This issue has been addressed in [2] , by comparing observations of visible actions in runs of a system (hence including runs containing non-declassified confidential actions), and observations of visible actions in runs of the same system that only contain confidential actions that are declassified afterwards. Most IFPs have been expressed as combinations of basic security predicates (BSPs) [3] , [4] or as a behavioral equivalence under observation contexts [5] . A systematic presentation of IFPs can be found, e.g., in [3] - [5] .
Despite the fact that IFPs are always informally expressed in term of causality i.e., confidential activity should not cause observable effects on the public behaviour, they are almost always formalized in terms of interleaving semantics [6] - [9] and hence, do not consider true concurrency or causality. This is clearly a lack in the formalization of IFPs for several reasons. First, from an algorithmic point of view, it is usually inefficient to compute a set of interleavings to address a problem that can be solved on an equivalent partial order representation. Second, from a practical point of view, an attacker of a system may gain more information if he knows that some confidential action has occurred recently in its causal past. Indeed, transactions in a distributed system can leave many traces (visited websites, cookies,...) on machines which are not a priori committed to protect confidential actions of third parties. Recently, however, [10] proposed a characterization of NI as a syntactic property of its unfolding in the context of true concurrency semantics for Petri nets, but the technique addresses only safe nets.
Very few results address IFPs for unbounded models. BSPs and NI are proved undecidable for pushdown systems, but decidability was obtained for small subclasses of context-free languages [11] . Decidability of a bisimulation-based strengthened version of NI called non-deducibility on composition (NDC) for unbounded Petri nets is proved in [8] . A system satisfies NDC if observation of its visible actions remains indistinguishable from the observation of the system interacting with any environment. This result was extended in [9] to INI with selective declassification (INISD). Contribution. This work considers IFPs for an unbounded true concurrency model, namely High-level Message Sequence Charts (HMSCs). This model, standardized by the ITU [12] , is well accepted to represent executions of distributed systems, where security problems are of primary concern. We first define a class of IFPs on HMSCs, as an inclusion relation on observations, following [5] , [11] and [13] . We prove that observation inclusion (and hence the simple NI property and most of IFPs) is undecidable for HMSCs. We then characterize decidable sub-classes of the problem: inclusion becomes decidable when the observation of the specified system is regular, and in particular when visible events are located on a single process, and even when the considered HMSC is not regular. We then discuss the meaning of NI in a context where causal dependencies among occurrences of events are considered. This leads to a new notion called causal interference for HMSCs. Causal interference detects interference as soon as an attacker can observe occurrences of confidential actions from visible events, and furthermore, one of the observed events is a consequence of the confidential one. We finally relax causal interference in the context of declassification. We introduce intransitive causal non-interference that considers observable causal dependencies among confidential and visible events as safe, as soon as a declassification occurs in between. We show that all local variants of these problems are PSPACE-complete. Outline. Model definitions are given in Section II. In Section III, we first introduce observations of HMSCs, then we formally define inclusion problems and non-interference and show their undecidability for HMSCs. In Section IV, we characterize information flow in a single finite scenario, and rephrase it in terms of coloring, and show in Section V that NI in HMSCs can be solved by reusing this coloring, and is PSPACE-complete for cases where observation is limited to a single process. We extend this framework to declassification and we prove the decidability of a local version of interference with (selective) declassification in Section VI. We compare our approach with related works, and conclude in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the models that will be used throughout the paper, namely automata and High-level Message Sequence Charts (HMSCs), with their associated languages. Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are formal representations of distributed executions, i.e., chronograms, that are frequently used to depict the behavior of a set of asynchronous communicating processes. This simple graphical representation emphasizes on messages and localization of actions, with partial order semantics. The model of HMSCs, standardized by the ITU [12] , was proposed to describe the more elaborate behaviors of distributed systems, for instance those of communication protocols, by combining MSCs. Illustrations of MSCs and HMSCs are given in Figures 1 and 2 of Sections IV and V. HMSCs are used to describe typical scenarios for the use of distributed systems, and then serve as requirements. They can also be used as input to generate code skeletons for distributed systems. Hence, an information leak that appears in these early requirement is likely to be a feature of the final system. It is then interesting to find these leaks at early design stages. Another interesting point with HMSCs is their expressive power: they define behaviors of systems with asynchronous communications, which are not necessarily finite state systems. They are uncomparable with Petri nets, for instance. Answering interference questions for HMSCs provides security techniques for a whole class of infinite systems that can not be modeled with other formalisms.
Let Σ be a finite alphabet. A word over Σ is a sequence w = a 1 a 2 . . . a n of letters from Σ, and Σ * denotes the set of finite words over Σ, with ε the empty word. A language is a subset L of Σ * . A finite automaton over Σ is a tuple A = (S, δ, s 0 , F ), where S is a finite set of states, s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, F ⊆ S is a set of accepting states, and δ ⊆ S× Σ × S is a transition relation. A word w = a 1 . . . a n ∈ Σ * , is accepted by A if there exists a sequence of transitions labeled by a i 's, starting from s 0 and ending in an accepting state, i.e., ∃s 1 , . . . s n , ∀i ∈ 1..n, (s i−1 , a i , s i ) ∈ δ with s n ∈ F . It is well known that automata accept regular languages.
A Labeled Partial Order (LPO) over alphabet Σ is a triple (E, ≤, α) where (E, ≤) is a partially ordered set (poset) and α : E → Σ is a labeling of E by letters of Σ. The set of all LPOs over alphabet Σ is denoted by LP O(Σ). Given a relation R ⊆ X × X on some set X, we denote by R * the transitive and reflexive closure of R.
Definition 1 (MSC): A Message Sequence Chart over finite sets P of processes, M of messages and finite alphabet A, is a tuple M = (E, (≤ p ) p∈P , α, µ, φ), where • E is a finite set of events, partitioned as E = E S ⊎ E R ⊎ E I , according to the type of event considered: message sending, reception, or internal action (also called atomic action); • φ : E → P is a mapping associating with each event the process that executes it. Hence, the sets E p = φ −1 ({p}) for p ∈ P, also form a partition of E; • For every process p ∈ P, the relation ≤ p ⊆ E p × E p is a total ordering on events located on process p;
changes, such that if (e, f ) ∈ µ with e ∈ E p and f ∈ E q , then p = q. Furthermore, it induces a bijection from E S onto E R , so with a slight abuse of notation, (e, f ) ∈ µ is also written as f = µ(e). With each pair (e, f ) ∈ µ is associated a message in M; • α is a mapping from E to Σ ⊆ (P×{!, ?}×P×M)∪(P× A), associating a label with each event. The labeling is consistent with µ: if f = µ(e), with associated message m, sent by process p to process q, then α(e) is written as p!q(m) and α(f ) as q?p(m). If e is an internal action a located on process p, then α(e) is of the form p(a). The labeling is extended by morphism over E * . We write ≤ M for the relation ≤ M = ( p∈P ≤ p ∪ µ) * , and require that for any MSC M , ≤ M is a partial order, that is a reflexive, transitive, and acyclic relation. When clear from the context, we will simply write ≤ instead of ≤ M .
We denote by Msc(P, M, A) the set of all MSCs over the sets P of processes, M of messages, and alphabet A. The usual terminology and definitions of partially ordered sets apply to MSCs. For an event e ∈ E of M , the set of predecessors of e is M is
Definition 2: A linear extension of an MSC with n events M = (E, (≤ p ) p∈P , α, µ, φ) is a sequence r = e 1 e 2 . . . e n of all events of M such that for every j > k e j e k . A linearization of M is a word w ∈ Σ * such that there exists a linear extension r of M with w = α(r). The language of M , written L(M ), is the set of all linearizations of M .
The language of a MSC is hence defined over alphabet Σ = {p!q(m) | p, q ∈ P ∧ m ∈ M} ∪ {p?q(m) | p, q ∈ P, m ∈ M} ∪ {p(a) | p ∈ P, a ∈ A}. To design more elaborate behaviors, including choices and iterations, MSCs are composed. A key ingredient is sequential composition, that assembles MSCs processwise to form larger MSCs.
. This (associative) operation, also called concatenation, can be extended to n MSCs and is used to give a semantics to higher level constructs, namely HMSCs. Roughly speaking, an HMSC is a finite automaton where transitions are labeled by MSCs. It describes a set of MSCs obtained by assembling (using sequential composition) MSCs that appear along paths.
Definition 4 (HMSC): A High-level MSC (HMSC) is a tuple H = (N, →, M, n 0 , F ), where N is a set of nodes, M is a finite set of MSCs, →⊆ N × M × N is a transition relation, n 0 ∈ N is the initial node, and F is a set of accepting nodes.
As for any kind of automaton, paths and languages can be defined for HMSCs. A path ρ of H is a sequence of transitions t 1 t 2 . . . t k such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, t i = (n i , M i , n ′ i ) belongs to →, with n ′ i = n i+1 for each i ≤ k − 1. A path ρ is accepting if it starts from node n 0 (i.e., t 1 = (n 0 , M 1 , n 1 )), and it terminates in a node of F (i.e., t k = (n k , M k , n ′ k ) for some n ′ k ∈ F ). Definition 5: Let ρ = t 1 t 2 . . . t k be a path of a HMSC H.
More intuitively, the MSC associated with a path is obtained by concatenating MSCs encountered along this path after renaming the events to obtain disjoint sets of events. To simplify notation, we often drop the isomorphisms used to rename events, writing simply
With this automaton structure and the sequential composition of MSCs, an HMSC H defines a set of accepting paths, denoted by P H , a set of MSCs F H = {M ρ | ρ ∈ P H }, and a linearization language L(H) = M∈FH L(M ). Finally note that a single MSC M can be seen as a particular HMSC H M with a single transition (n 0 , M, n 1 ) between two nodes, hence a single path from initial node n 0 to final node n 1 and language L(H M ) = L(M ).
It is well known that the linearization language of a HMSC is not necessarily regular, but rather a closure of a regular language under partial commutation, which yields many undecidability results (see for instance [14] , [15] ). This does not immediately mean that all IFPs are undecidable for HMSCs: indeed, we later define non-trivial and meaningful subclasses of HMSCs and observations for which these problems become decidable.
III. OBSERVATION AND NON-INTERFERENCE FOR HMSCS
The power of an external observer can be described by an observation function, mapping every behavior of a system to some observables. In [3] , [4] , [11] , observation functions are seen as some particular kind of language theoretic operations (projection, morphism, insertion, deletion of letters,...), and in [13] , they are defined as combinations of rational operations (transductions, intersections, unions of rational languages).
In a distributed context, visible events can originate from sensors that belong to different processes, and occurrences of such events can easily be recorded. If the system is equipped with vectorial clocks, one can also record causal dependencies among observed events. However, even if those visible events happen to be observed in some particular linear order, this does not mean that this order corresponds to the actual execution, because the processes are not synchronized. Hence, while weaker than a linearization, the natural and realistic notion of observation for distributed computations is a labeled partial order, where events that are not surely causally dependant are considered concurrent.
Definition 6: An observation function is a mapping from Msc(P, M, A) to LP O(B) for some alphabet B.
As proposed in [4] with the notion of views, the alphabet labeling events that occur during an execution of a system can be partitioned as Σ = V ⊎ C ⊎ N with visible, confidential and internal (neutral) labels. Actions with labels in V can be observed while actions labeled in C are confidential and should be hidden. Internal actions have labels in N and are not observable a priori, but need not be kept secret. Subsequently, depending on their labels, events are also called visible, confidential, or internal events.
Various observation functions can be defined from such a partition. The most natural ones are restrictions to visible events, and pruning of confidential actions, which are standard operations in language based non-interference literature, but need to be precisely defined in a partial order setting. Let M = (E, (≤ p ) p∈P , α, µ, φ) be an MSC with labeling alphabet Σ. We consider the following observation functions:
• identity: the identity id(M ) = M outputs the same LPO as the executed MSC;
represents the visible events and their causal dependencies that one may observe during the complete execution of M ; Note that restriction to α −1 (V ) suffices, as ≤ is a transitive relation.
) is a function that prunes out the future of confidential events from M . Intuitively, O V \C (M ) represents the visible events and their causal dependencies, observed when no confidential event is executed within M ;
, for a given process p ∈ P, is the observation of visible events of M restricted to those events located on process p. Note that O p (M ) is a total order. In a distributed setting, O p (M ) is particularly interesting, as it represents the point of view of a single process p ∈ P, considered as the attacker of the system. We hence assume no restriction on the set of events that can be executed and observed by p, and let V = Σ p = α(E p ) when using O p . As noticed by [11] in a language setting, information flow properties of a system S are usually defined as compositions of atomic propositions of the form op 1 (S) ⊆ op 2 (S). Changing the observation functions (or the partition of Σ) leads to a variety of atomic properties. Information flow properties of MSCs can be defined similarly.
For a single MSC M , the classical notion of noninterference by language equivalence translates as follows:
\C and O p,• , however, do not take in account the structure of the HMSC generating F H , and furthermore, they are not necessarily compositional. In general, an observation function O is not a morphism with respect to the concatenation, that is,
. This drawback was already observed in [16] for projections of MSCs: in general,
. Hence, checking inclusion for HMSCs may require to consider properties of complete sequences of MSCs as a whole, raising algorithmic difficulties, or even undecidability. Other, more interesting ways to extend observations to HMSCs, are to assemble observations of MSCs piecewise, following the automaton structure of HMSCs, or to forbid MSCs containing confidential events: 
. We say that an observation function O for a set of HMSCs H is regular if L(O(H)) is regular for every H ∈ H and that O is effectively regular if for every H ∈ H, one can compute a finite automaton recognizing L(O(H)). Observation function O p is an example of effectively regular observation function. Defining (effective) regularity for sets of HMSCs leads to characterize observation functions that have good properties for infinite classes of HMSCs. For instance, for the class of locally-synchronized HMSCs defined in [14] , that have regular linearization languages, O V,• is effectively regular.
HMSC languages are not always regular and the observation of an HMSC needs not be regular either. It was proved in [16] that HMSC projections are close to Compositional Message Sequence Charts. Even when a projection of an HMSC is an HMSC language (i.e., a language recognizable by an HMSC), equivalence, inclusion or emptiness of intersection are undecidable. In fact, due to the close relationship between HMSCs and Mazurkiewicz traces, most properties requiring to compare languages or partial order families are undecidable for HMSCs ( [14] , [15] , [17] ). So, given two HMSCs H 1 and
We hence have the following result:
Proof Sketch. The proof is a reduction from the inclusion problem L(H 1 ) ⊆ L(H 2 ) for two HMSCs H 1 and H 2 . We build an HMSC H, that behaves like H 1 or H 2 if a confidential action can occur, and like H 2 otherwise, and choose observation functions
. The construction of this HMSC H is detailed in Appendix. The decidability part is an immediate consequence of decidability of inclusion for regular languages.
Note that the exact complexity of inclusion problems in the decidable cases depends on the size of the automata recognizing L(O 1 (H)) and L(O 2 (H)), and hence does not immediately fall into a determined complexity class holding for any pair of effectively regular observation functions. From Proposition 10, we obtain the following undecidability result:
Corollary 11: Non-interference for HMSCs is undecidable.
In the rest of the paper, we propose to weaken the requirements of NI, by choosing appropriate observation functions which will be shown effectively regular for any set H of HMSCs. This restriction is necessary, due to the fact that effective regularity of an observation function is undecidable (see proof of Theorem 12 in Appendix).
Theorem 12: Let O be an observation function on alphabet Σ = C ⊎ V ⊎ N and let H be a set of HMSCs. One cannot decide in general if O is effectively regular for H.
IV. MSCS COLORING Interference is frequently described as causal dependencies between confidential actions and observable ones. The problem, however, is often defined in terms of languages, with interleaved representation, even for true concurrency models. In this section, we first show that interference in a single MSC can be defined in terms of causal dependencies from confidential events (in C) to visible ones (in V ). We then show that checking existence of such dependencies can be performed via a coloring of events.
For 
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix. The result shows that even if interference in a MSC M was defined in terms of languages equivalence (Def. 8), it can also be equivalently characterized as a property of its causal dependencies, i.e., without computing the whole interleaved representation of M . This relation between causal dependencies and interference calls for a graphical interpretation of interference in MSCs, represented as a propagation of a black token inherited from confidential actions along causal dependencies. Intuitively, any confidential action and successors of actions marked with a black token are also marked with a black token and every process containing a black action is also marked as black. Though the black/white coloring of MSCs is not essential to prove interference, it will be used later to detect information flows in HMSCs. Intuitively, a black process can detect occurrences of confidential events, as it executes events that are causal con-sequences of confidential events. Clearly, an MSC is noninterferent if and only if it does not contain visible black events. Figure 1 shows a coloring of an MSC in black and white. The alphabet of confidential actions is C = {q(c)} and contains the label of the atomic action c executed by process q. We attach a black token to every black event and a white token to other events. Similarly, we indicate with a black/white token below process lines whether a process has met a black token during its execution. In this example, process p can detect occurrences of c (it is black after M bw ), but process s cannot.
Deciding if an MSC is interferent, or equivalently if it contains a visible black event then consists in finding a path from a confidential event to a visible one in an acyclic graph where events are seen as vertices and pairs of events (e, f ) in (∪ p∈P ≤ p ) ∪ µ as edges. Since an event has at most two immediate successors, the graph to consider has at most n = |E M | vertices and 2n edges. Hence, coloring of MSCs and interference detection can be performed in linear time as a graph exploration starting from confidential events.
We now show that deciding the black/white status of a process along a sequence of MSCs of arbitrary size can be performed with bounded memory.
or it is black after M 2 , or there exists a process q black after M 1 and a pair of events e ≤ f in M 2 such that e is located on q and f is located on p.
This important property means that it is sufficient to remember the black/white status of each process after concatenation M 1 • · · · • M k along a path of an HMSC to compute the status of process p after concatenation M 1 • · · · • M k • M k+1 .
V. LOCAL AND CAUSAL NON INTERFERENCE
Despite general undecidability of the inclusion problem and non-interference (Proposition 10), the problem becomes decidable with regular observation functions. As effective regularity of an observation function is undecidable (Thm. 12), we must rely on subclasses of observations for which this property is guaranteed. We show in this section that observation functions describing the discriminating power of a single process are effectively regular. In this restricted setting, it is then possible to decide whether a process p ∈ P can detect occurrences of confidential actions. As HMSCs explicitly specify distribution of actions on processes, exhibiting the behavior of a fixed process within an HMSC specification is an easy task. In this section, we show that this local setting allows for the definition of two decidable notions of non-interference.
A. Local interference
Considering the attacker of a system as a single process p ∈ P, with action labels in some alphabet Σ p = α(E p ), we should assume that process p does not execute confidential actions, that is C ∩ Σ p = ∅. In a similar way, the observation power of a single process should be restricted to its own events, hence we can safely set V = Σ p . The definition of noninterference (Def. 8) proposed in section III can accommodate this particular partition of the alphabet. From now on, we consider this restricted form of non-interference, and call it local non-interference.
For a single MSC, it is then defined as satisfaction of two inclusion problems, with O V \C and O p as observation functions. This property can be verified by checking whether ↓ (α −1 (C))∩E p = ∅ that is checking if no causal consequence of a confidential action is located on process p. In other words, one need to check that p is not marked with a black token. As explained in section IV, this can be performed in linear time. We can now look at local interference for HMSCs.
Definition 16: Let H be an HMSC over a set of processes P, with labeling alphabet As concatenation of MSCs imposes a total order on events of the same process, these projection are concatenations of finite sequences of events (local projections of MSCs along transitions of H). Hence A p (H) has transitions using labels of event located on process p, and just needs to remember the transition of H that is recognized (the current MSC under execution), and an integer symbolizing the last event of the current MSC executed by p. Similarly, we can design an HMSC H \C where transitions are labeled by MSC that do not contain confidential events, and hence an automaton A ′ p (H) that accepts only projections on p of sequences of MSCs with only white events.
Corollary 18: The problem of deciding local interference of an HMSC H with respect to a given process p ∈ P is PSPACE-complete. Proof Sketch. Using the results of proposition 17, the problem consists in comparing the languages of two automata (whence the complexity in PSPACE). For the hardness part, we can also show that any regular language inclusion problem can be encoded as a local interference problem.
Local interference is decidable, and describes a situation where a process can discover that the running execution of the system contains or will contain a confidential action. However, local interference does not distinguish between a situation where an observation is a causal consequence of some confidential action and a situation where observation and confidential action highlighted by the interference are concurrent. Language-based comparison of observations (and also in general most of language-based non-interference settings) only characterize the possibility for an attacker to reveal occurrence of confidential actions during a run of a system.
B. Causal interference
We first give a concrete example showing that interference is much more dangerous when the confidential event that is detected lays within the causal past of some observation. Nowadays, a lot of attention is devoted to privacy. However, it is well known that users spread a lot of information to visited sites when browsing the web. This information is not always local information (cookies, cache, etc.) that can be erased by users if needed. It can also be information stored elsewhere on the web: logs, forms, etc.. When observation of a causal consequence of a confidential action (Mr X has bought a book on commercial site Y ) by an attacker indicates that a confidential operation has occurred, this may also mean that classified information might be available at some vulnerable site (the credit card details of X are stored somewhere on Y 's website). Hence, characterizing interference where confidential actions and observations are causally related, is important. On the HMSC depicted in Figure 2 , the projection of MSCs recognized by H on p is the language (?n) * .(?m+?n), and every MSC with projection on p in (?n) * .?m is the projection of a concatenation of several occurrences of M 3 , followed by one occurrence of M 1 , which contains a confidential event. According to definition 16, this HMSC is locally interferent. However, when observing arrival of message m, process p can deduce that it is currently executing a behavior in which a confidential action occurs, but not that this action has already occurred. This means in particular that NI does not always characterize a cause to effect relation among hidden actions and observation. To overcome this weakness of languagebased information flow characterizations, the notion of NDC (Non-Deducibility on Composition) has been proposed to detect when confidential actions cause observable effects. Formally, NDC says that a system S composed with any process R (that enables/forbids confidential events) is observationally equivalent to S.
In the rest of this section, we propose a decidable notion of causal interference (still with respect to a fixed attacker p ∈ P). It emphasizes on causal dependencies between confidential and visible actions of the system. Bearing in mind that a black event located on process p is a consequence of a confidential event, we show that causal dependencies can be highlighted in terms of an observation function built using the black/white tokens attached to events and processes within an MSC. We want to check if a process p can detect whether some confidential action has occurred in the causal past of its observed events. In other words, this means that the projection on p of an execution of H contains a black event, and that equivalent projections also contain black events.
Definition 19: For an HMSC H and a process p ∈ P, H is causally non-interferent (with respect to p) if for every MSC M in F H such that M contains a black event on process p, there exists another MSC M ′ in F H such that • M ′ contains no black event on process p, and
Causal non-interference is weaker that NDC: it compares the observations of an HMSC with the observations that are still possible whitout confidential events. NDC compares a behavior of a specification with a specification controlled by a process R, in which some confidential events can be allowed.
Theorem 20: For a fixed set of processes P, deciding causal non-interference of an HMSC H with respect to a process p ∈ P is PSPACE-complete.
We prove this theorem in several steps. We use the result of Proposition 15, i.e., the fact that black/white coloring of processes at the end of a sequence of concatenated MSCs can be done by remembering the status of processes after each MSC. This property holds for MSCs built along paths of HMSCs, and is used (in Proposition 21) to build HMSCs that recognize MSCs that belong to F H and after which a fixed process is black (or similarly remains white). These HMSCs contain nodes of H, but remember for each node n whether processes are black or white after an MSC built along a path ending in n. Then causal interference will be reduced to an inclusion problem of effectively regular observation functions.
Proposition 21: Let H be an HMSC, p ∈ P, and Σ = C ⊎ V ⊎ N . Then, one can build:
• an HMSC H B,p that recognizes MSCs from F H after which p is a black process. • an HMSC H W,p that recognizes MSCs from F H after which p is a white process. of sizes in O(|H|.2 |P| ). Proof Sketch. The nodes of the HMSCs built in the proof memorize a node of the original HMSC, plus information on the color of each process (according to Proposition 15, this is the only information needed to remember the color of a process along a path of H). Accepting nodes require p to be black in H B,p , and white in H W,p .
We are now ready to prove theorem 20: Proof of theorem 20. Emptiness of regular language is an NLOGSPACE problem, but the size of the automaton that recognizes the intersection is in O(n.2 |P| .2 n.2 |P| ), that is inclusion can be performed with space in O(log(n) + |P| + n.2 |P| ). For a fixed set of processes, the space needed to check causal interferences is hence polynomial in the size of the input HMSC.
As for local non-interference, the hardness result can be proved by polynomial encoding of a regular language inclusion problem. Consider two regular languages L 1 , L 2 . Then one can design two HMSCs H 1 , H 2 with initial nodes n 1 0 , n 2 0 such that L(O p (H i )) = L i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then using the MSC M ′ c of Figure 4 (in Appendix), one can design a new HMSC H that contains all transitions and accepting nodes of H 1 , H 2 , with initial node n 2 0 and an additional transition t 1 = (n 0 , M ′ c , n 1 0 ). The MSC M ′ c contains one confidential event on some process P c , followed by messages from P c to all processes in P. This way, any path of H that starts with transition t 1 generates an MSC in which p is black, and whose projection is in L 1 . Other paths that do not start with t 1 generate MSCs from F H2 , and in particular MSCs in which p is white and whose projection on p is in L 2 . Clearly, H is causally interferent with respect to p if and only if L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
Causal interference can be checked in O(log(|H|) + |P| + |H|.2 |P| ). It is polynomial in space in the size of the HMSC, and exponential in the number of processes, but HMSC specifications are usually defined for small sets of processes. Also remark that reusing the construction of H W,p , we can easily design an automaton recognizing O V,• \C (H) as soon as
VI. DECLASSIFICATION Non-interference considers confidential information as secrets that should remain undisclosed along all runs of a system. This point of view is too strict to be of practical interest: In many cases, confidentiality of a secret action has a limited duration and secrets can be downgraded. Consider the following example: a user wants to buy an item online, and pays by sending his credit card information. Everything from this transaction between the online shop and the buyer (even if encryption is used) should remain secret. Within this setting, all payment steps should be considered confidential, and flow from these actions to observable events should be prevented. However, if a buyer uses a one time credit card (i.e. a virtual credit card number generated on request that can be used only once for a transaction), then all information on the card is valueless as soon as the payment is completed. Hence, after completing the transaction, learning that a payment occurred is harmless and the sequence of interactions implementing a secured online payment need not be kept secret. This declassification possibility was first proposed as conditional interference by [1] and later defined in [2] as intransitive interference. Intransitive non interference (INI) can be formulated as follows: any run of the system that contains a confidential action that is not declassified has an equivalent run from the observer's point of view. Usually, INI is defined using a pruning function that removes from a run all confidential actions that are not declassified, and compares observations of pruned and normal runs (see [7] for a definition of INI for transition systems).
From now on, we assume that the alphabet Σ = C ⊎ V ⊎ N contains a particular subset D ⊆ V ⊎ N of declassification events. Intuitively, declassification events downgrade all their confidential causal predecessors.
Definition 22: Let M be an MSC. An event e ∈ E M is classified if it is a confidential event (α(e) ∈ C), it has an observable successor v ∈ V and it is not declassified before v, i.e. there exists no d such that e ≤ d ≤ v and α(d) ∈ D. We denote by Clas(M ) the set of classified
. We can characterize INI in a single MSC M as a property depending on the causal order in M and on the sets of confidential, declassification, and observable events.
Proposition 23: An MSC M is intransitively noninterferent w.r.t. an alphabet Σ = C ⊎ V ⊎ N and a set of declassification letters D iff for every pair of events c ≤ v such that α(c) ∈ C and α(v) ∈ V , we have
This proposition means that a declassification must occur between every confidential event and a causally related visible event. We now define observation functions for HMSCs and propose a definition of intransitive non interference for HM-
We follow the definition of [7] to define INI for HMSCs. An HMSC is INI if for every intransitively interferent (II for short) MSC M in F H , there
Definition 24: ,D (H) ). Note that all II MSCs are also interferent, and that checking noninterference amounts to checking INI with D = ∅. This remark extends to HMSCs: all intransitively interferent HMSCs are also causally interferent, and checking causal interference amount to checking INI with D = ∅. We then establish the following result:
Theorem 25: INI for HMSCs is undecidable. For a fixed set of processes, if V ⊆ Σ p , then INI is PSPACE-complete.
We prove the decidability part of this theorem in three steps 
This proposition can be intuitively seen as a property of causal chains. A causal chain from c to v is a sequence of events c ≤ e 1 ≤ . . . e n ≤ v. We say that a chain from c to v is declassified if α(e i ) ∈ D for some i ∈ 1..n. Then an MSC is INI if for any pair (c, v) of confidential/visible events such that c ≤ v there exists at least one declassified causal chain from c to v. If so, the confidential event c must be declassified by the occurrence of some declassifying action before the execution of v occurs.
A causal chain from c to v in M 1 • M 2 can be decomposed into a chain from c to the maximal event f on a process q in M 1 , a causal ordering from f to a minimal event f ′ located on process q in M 2 coming from the sequential composition of M 1 and M 2 , and then a causal chain from the minimal event f ′ on q to v. However, one does not need to know precisely the contents of M 1 to decide whether M 1 • M 2 is INI. It suffices to remember for each process p the confidential events of M 1 that are not yet declassified and are predecessors of the maximal event executed by process p in M 1 . On the example depicted in Figure 3 , MSC M 1 (left) contains three confidential actions c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and a declassification operation d. On the right, MSC M 2 contains three visible actions v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , and a declassification operation d. All other events belong to α −1 (N ). Both MSCs are INI, since no observation depends on a confidential action in M 1 or in M 2 . However, in the concatenation M 1 • M 2 , execution of v 1 or v 2 reveals the occurrence of c 2 . Also note that c 1 is declassified by the first occurrence of d in M 1 . This example is particularly interesting, as it shows that in order to abstract an arbitrarily long execution, it is not sufficient to remember a boolean value indicating whether there exists a not yet declassified action on a process, as two confidential events can be declassified via different ways. Indeed, some confidential actions could be declassified for a process while some others could not, even when located on the same process.
We can characterize II MSCs in a set F H by remembering finite sets of shapes of causal chains. In order to define these shapes, let M be a MSC, let c be a confidential event in M . We • there exists a process p such that cl(c, M 1 )(p) = +, and an event f located on p in M 2 , such that no causal chain from f to v is declassified. • for every process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = ⊤ there exists no event f ≤ v located on q, and v is not located on q. One can furthermore compute cl(c, M 1 •M 2 •· · ·•M k )(p) incrementally with finite memory. We have cl(c, M 1 • M 2 )(p) = ⊥ if cl(c, M 1 )(p) = ⊥, and if there exists no pair of events e ≤ f in M 2 with f is located of p, and cl(c, M 1 )(φ(e)) = ⊥.
We have cl(c, M 1 • M 2 )(p) = + if cl(c, M 1 )(p) ∈ {⊥, +}, there exists a process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = +, and a pair of events e ≤ f in M 2 such that e is minimal on q, f is maximal on process p, and furthermore, no causal chain from e to f is declassified, and for every process q ′ = q, if cl(c, M 1 )(q ′ ) = +, then no declassified causal chain from an event on q ′ to f exists in M 2 , if cl(c, M 1 )(q ′ ) = ⊤ then no causal chain from an event on q ′ to f exists in M 2 .
We have cl(c, M 1 • M 2 )(p) = ⊤ if cl(c, M 1 )(p) = ⊤, or • there exist a process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = + and a declassified chain from an event e located on process q to an event f located on process p, or • there exist a process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = ⊤, and a causal chain from an event e located on process q to an event f located on process p. Last, cl(c, M 1 • M 2 )(p) = ⊥ if cl(c, M 1 )(p) = ⊥ and M 2 does not contain a pair of events e ≤ f such that e is located on q with cl(c, M 1 )(q) = ⊥, and f is located on p. Now, if M 1 contains two confidential events c 1 , c 2 such that cl(c 1 , M 1 ) = cl(c 2 , M 1 ), then cl(c 1 , M 1 • M 2 ) = cl(c 2 , M 1 • M 2 ). It means that to detect interferences, one does not have to remember events, but only the shape of causal relations (existing, declassified or not) from confidential events to their successors on each process. There are at most 3 |P| such distinct shapes in a MSC, so one can check INI along arbitrarily long sequences of MSCs with finite memory.
Proposition 27: Let H be an HMSC, with labeling alphabet Σ and set D of declassification letters. Then, one can build an HMSC H II generating all II MSCs in F H and an HMSC H INI generating all INI MSCs in F H , with sizes at most 2.|H|.2 3 |P| Proof Sketch. We build HMSC H II as follows: a state (n, b, X) of H II memorizes a node n of H, a boolean b indicating whether an interference has been detected, and a set X = {cl 1 , . . . cl ℓ ), where each cl i is a function from P to {⊥, +, ⊤} that memorizes the shape of causal chains from a confidential event to maximal events on processes. H II follows transitions of H, and updates cl i 's. For each new confidential event c occurring in a transition labeled by an MSC M , a new function cl(c, M ) is appended to the current state. As soon as an interference is detected, b is set to true. Accepting states of H II are states where n is accepting in H, and b is true. H INI can be designed with a similar construction where accepting states are states with n accepting and b false.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 25: The declassification setting can be refined to consider selective declassification. Following the definition of [9] , in addition to the declassification alphabet D, we define a map h : D → 2 C , where h(α d ) defines the labels of confidential events that an action with label α d declassifies. Definition 22 easily adapts to this setting, simply by requiring that a causal chain from a confidential event c to a visible event v is declassified by an event d such that α(c) ∈ h(α(d)). We then say that an event c is classified if it is a confidential event (α(c) ∈ C), it has an observable successor v, and it is not declassified by one of the actions that can declassify it, that is, 
VII. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
Related work. Non-interference was seldom studied for scenario formalisms. A former work considers non-interference for Triggered Message Sequence Charts [18] . The interference property is defined in terms of comparison of ready sets (sets of actions that are fireable after a given sequence of actions w). However, this work mainly considers finite scenarios, and does not address decidability and complexity issues.
A first work considering non-interference for true concurrency models appears in [6] . The authors consider interference for elementary nets (i.e., nets where firing rules allow places to contain at most one token). They characterize causal places, where firing a high-level transition causally precedes the firing of a low-level one and conflict places, where firing a high-level transition inhibits the firing of a lowlevel one. Reachability of causal or conflict places is shown equivalent to BNDC (Bisimulation-based NDC, the variant using bisimulation instead of language equality). In [7] , the notion of intransitive non-interference from [2] is revisited for transition systems, and non-interference with downgraders is considered for elementary nets. A structural characterization is given in terms of reachable causal and conflict places. As in [6] , causal and conflict places are characterized in terms of possible fireable sequences of transitions, hence considering the interleaving semantics of the net.
Darondeau et al. [8] study (B)NDC and INI for unbounded labeled Petri nets, and extend their results to selective declassification in [9] . The authors obtain decidability results of these properties for injectively labeled nets by a very clever exploitation of decidability/undecidability results for language inclusion. The characterization relies on sequences of transitions, and not on causal properties of nets.
A contrario, Baldan et al [10] emphasize the fact that characterizing BNDC in terms of structural conditions expressing causality or conflict between high and low-level transitions, is a way to provide efficient algorithms to check interference. They propose a definition of complete unfolding w.r.t. noninterference, and reduce BNDC for safe nets to checking that a complete unfolding is weak-conflict and weak causal place free. Weak causal places characterize dependencies and conflicts between high and low transitions. Their results show that one can identify interferences in concurrency models without relying on interleaving semantics. The characterization of BNDC via weak conflict and causal places holds only for safe nets, i.e., for finite state systems.
Conclusion.
We have proposed a partial order framework for information flow properties analysis, and shown that noninterference is undecidable. However, as soon as observations are effectively regular, information flow properties become decidable. This can be enforced for instance by considering observation performed by a single process in the system, which leads to the notions of local non-interference and its extensions with declassification, that are all decidable. These problems are PSPACE-complete, with procedures that never compute the interleaving semantics of the original HMSC.
A possible refinement of the landscape is to consider sufficient conditions for decidability of interference when several processes can observe the system. We would also like to extend the current definitions to use the full dicriminating power of partial orders, i.e. consider non-interference properties of the form O 1 (H) ≡ O 2 (H), where ≡ denotes isomorphism. For observations localized on a single process, the current results suffice. When observations are effectively regular, but contain events located on more than one process, showing isomorphism could require other tools such as graph grammars to compare observations, and decidability of interference problems may require additional conditions.
Another line of research is to consider security issues when an attacker can interact with the system in order to gain information (active interference), or when he can get information on the current configuration of the system (statebased interference). Extending definitions of information flows in HMSCs to quantify the amount of information disclosure by mean of measures (e.g. probability measure, average number of bits leaked per action,...) is also a challenging task.
Proof Let us show that for any HMSC H = (N, →, M, n 0 , F ) one can effectively build a finite state automaton A p (H) recognizing L(O V,• (H)) or equivalently O p .
Let k be the maximal size of a projection of a MSC in M. The automaton A p (H) is defined by A p = (N × {0, . . . , k − 1}, δ, (n 0 , 0), F × {0}). Let (n, M, n ′ ) be a transition in H. The observation L(O p (M ) is a possibly empty word of Σ p . If π p (L(M )) = ε, then δ contains the transition ((n, 0), ε, (n ′ , 0)). If π p (M ) = a 1 . . . a q (with q ≤ k), then δ contains the transitions ((n, i − 1), a i , (n, i)) for each i ∈ {1, .., q − 1}, and ((n, q − 1), a q , (n ′ , 0) ).
An easy induction shows that for every path (n 0 , M 1 , n 1 ) . . . (n ℓ−1 , M ℓ , n ℓ ), such that the projection of each M i on p is a word w i = a i,1 . . . a i,qi there exists a path (n 0 , 0) 
Let us now design a new HMSC H \C = (N, → \C , M, n 0 , F ) such that (n, M, n ′ ) ∈→ \C iff (n, M, n ′ ) ∈→ and α(E M )∩C = ∅. Clearly, F H \C is the set of MSCs generated by H that do not contain actions from C, and H \C is also an HMSC. We have for HMSC H, i.e checking that L(A p (H)) ⊆ L(A ′ p (H)). Language inclusion for finite automata is a well-known PSPACE-complete problem, hence checking local non-interference is in PSPACE.
For the hardness part, let A = (Q A , δ A , q 0A , F A ) and B = (Q B , δ B , q 0B , F B ) be two automata over alphabet Σ, with disjoint set of states. Similarly to Figure 4 , we design a HMSC H = (Q A ⊎ Q B , →, q 0B , F A ⊎ F B ) over a set of processes {p 1 , p 2 , P c } and alphabet Σ ∪ {c}, with V = Σ and C = {c}, such that → contains:
• a transition (q 0B , M h , q 0A ) in which M c is an MSC with a single atomic confidential action located on process P c (like in Figure 4 ),
• for each (q, a, q ′ ) ∈ δ A ∪ δ B , a transition (q, M a , q ′ ) where M a is a MSC containing a single message m a from p 2 to p 1 . Then the language inclusion problem L(A) ⊆ L(B) can be reduced in polynomial time to local non-interference of H with respect to process p 1 . Hence, local non-interference is PSPACE-complete.
F. Proof of Proposition 21
Proposition 21. Let H be an HMSC, p ∈ P, and Σ = C ⊎ V ⊎ N . Then, one can build:
• an HMSC H B,p that recognizes MSCs from F H after which p is a black process. • an HMSC H W,p that recognizes MSCs from F H after which p is a white process. of size in O(|H|.2 |P| ). Proof. We build H B,p = (N B,p , → B,p , M, n B,p 0 , F B,p ) as follows:
• N B,p ⊆ N × 2 P is a set of nodes. In a pair (n, P ), n denotes a node of H, and P a subset of black processes. We set n BW 0 = (n 0 , ∅). • the set of transitions and nodes of H B,p is built inductively as follows: from a node (n, P ), if there exists a transition (n, M, n ′ ) in H, we add (n ′ , P ′ ) to N B,p , with P ′ = P ∪ {p ∈ P | ∃e ≤ M f ∧ φ(f ) = p ∧ φ(e) ∈ P } ∪ {p ∈ P | ∃e ≤ f, α(e) ∈ C ∧ φ(f ) = p}, and we add transition (n, P ), M, (n ′ , P ′ ) to → B,p • F B,p = F × {P ∈ 2 P | p ∈ P } is the set of accepting nodes. A path of H B,p is accepting if it ends after recognizing an MSC M ∈ F H such that p is black after M . Building H W,p = (N W,p , → W,p , M, n W,p 0 , F W,p ) can be done in a similar way, but setting F W,p = F × {P ∈ 2 P | p ∈ P }.
The status of a process is built progressively along transitions in a path. Following proposition 15, the process part of a node in H B,p or H W,p faithfully encodes the status of a process in the MSCs generated by sequences of transitions ending in this node. Hence, H B,p (resp. H W,p ) recognize MSCs of F H after which p is black (resp. white).
As the nodes of these HMSCs belong to N × 2 P , the size of H B,p or H W,p is in O(|H|.2 |P| ).
G. Proof of Proposition 27
Proposition 27. Let H be an HMSC, Σ an alphabet and D be a set of declassification letters. Then, one can build that are of sizes at most 2.|H|.2 3 |P| Proof. We first show how H II = (N II , → II , M, n II 0 , F II ) is computed, then we show that H II recognizes intransitively interferent MSC generated by H. We first define the following functions. A map cl : P → {+, ⊥, ⊤} represents existing causal dependencies from a confidential event to maximal event of processes, plus gives information on whether a causal chain ending on a process declassifies this confidential event. We denote by CL(M ) the set of functions that are computed starting from all confidential events. Note that if M contains no confidential event, then CL(M ) = ∅. Given two MSCs M 1 , M 2 , we have seen that M 1 • M 2 is intransitively interferent if M 1 is II, or M 2 is II, or there exists cl ∈ CL(M 1 ) such that cl(p) = + and M 2 contains a chain from an event located on process to an observable event v such that there exists no chain from an event on process q to v with cl(q) = ⊤. Hence, knowing if M 1 is II or not, and CL(M 1 ), one can decide whether M 1 • M 2 is II. We denote by II(CL, M ) the predicate that is true when a set of maps CL representing causal chains and declassification in an MSC M ′ allows to prove that M ′ • M contains an intransitive interference.
The crux is then to be able to maintain CL(M 1 • · · · • M k ) and the II information along path of H. For a given map cl and an MSC M , we define the map U pdate(cl, M ) as follows:
We have U pdate(cl, M )(p) = ⊥ if cl(p) = ⊥, and if there exists no pair of events e ≤ f in M 2 with f is located of p, and cl(φ(e)) = ⊥.
We have U pdate(cl, M )(p) = + if cl(p) ∈ {⊥, +}, and there exists a process q such that cl(q) = +, and pair of events e ≤ f in M 2 such that e is minimal on q, f is maximal on process p, and furthermore, no causal chain from e to f is declassified, and for every process q ′ = q, if cl(q ′ ) = +, then no declassified causal chain from an event on q ′ to f exists in M 2 , if cl(q ′ ) = ⊤ then no causal chain from an event on q ′ to f exists in M 2 .
We have U pdate(cl, M )(p) = ⊤ if • cl(p) = ⊤, or • there exist a process q such that cl(q) = + and a declassified chain from an event e located on process q to an event f located on process p, or • there exist a process q such that cl(q) = ⊤, and a causal chain from an event e located on process q to an event f located on process p.
The map updating function extends to sets of maps the obvious way : U pdate(X, M ) =
